




Orson	 Scott	 Card’s	 1986	 novel,	 Speaker	 for	 the	 Dead,	 presents	 a	
society	 in	 which,	 alongside	 the	 clerics	 and	 customs	 of	 traditional	
religions,	 the	 dead	may	 be	mourned	 by	 summoning	 Speakers,	 who	
serve	 “as	 priests	 to	 people	 who	 acknowledged	 no	 god	 and	 yet	




they	 speak	 for,	 in	 place	 of,	 rather	 than	 about	 the	 dead;	 they	 take	
control	of	the	private	knowledge	of	the	deceased	and	disseminate	it	
on	 their	 behalf,	 healing	 relationships	 that	 had	 been	 damaged	 by	





their	 Facebook	 statuses	 and	 profile	 pictures,	 or	 broadcast	 Twitter	
updates	 to	proclaim	 “Je	 suis	Charlie.”	A	month	previously,	 a	 similar	
outpouring	of	digital	sentiment	took	place	in	response	to	a	New	York	
grand	jury’s	decision	not	to	indict	white	police	officers	who	had	been	
filmed	 choking	 a	 black	 man	 named	 Eric	 Garner	 to	 death:	
#icantbreathe.	Approximately	eighteen	months	later,	the	shooting	of	
fifty	 people	 during	 Latinx	 Night	 at	 the	 Pulse	 nightclub	 in	 Orlando,	
Florida,	gave	rise	to	#WeAreOrlando.	In	this	paper,	I	wish	to	consider	
these	mourning	rituals	not	as	an	entirely	new	phenomenon,	but	as	a	
continuation	 of	 a	 much	 longer	 historical	 trend	 in	 which,	 as	 I	 have	
argued	 at	 some	 length	 in	 previous	 publications,	 public	
memorialisation	 functions	 to	 construct	 and	 enforce	 a	 collective	
identity.	2	I	 do	 not	 intend	 to	 repeat	 that	 previous	 argument	 within	






2	See	especially	Vincent,	A.,	‘Forgetting Capsules: Public Monuments and 
Religious Ritual’, in Monument and Memory, ed. Mattias Martinson. Berlin: 
LIT-Verlag; Vincent, A., Making Memory: Jewish and Christian Explorations 
in Monument, Narrative and Liturgy. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Press.	
Card’s	 Speakers	 for	 the	Dead	offer	 a	 remedy	 for,	 and	 thereby	
assurance	 against,	 the	 terrifying	 void	 of	 death—not	 the	 void	 that	
each	individual	might	encounter	at	the	end	of	their	own	life,	but	the	
void	of	unfinished	business,	unresolved	relationships,	an	inability	to	
account	 or	 compensate	 for	 loss	 that	 confronts	 those	 who	 remain	
behind,	fear	of	which	has	given	rise	to	countless	ghost	stories	and,	I	
wish	 to	 suggest,	 also	underlies	 appropriative	mourning	movements	
such	 as	 je	 suis	 Charlie,	 #ican’tbreathe,	 and	 #WeAreOrlando.	 Laying	
claim	 to	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 victim	 of	 a	 widely	 publicised	 tragedy	
offers	 an	 opportunity	 for	 symbolic	 role-playing,	 in	 which	 the	
individuals	 claiming	 the	 identity	 are	 able	 to	 mitigate	 against	 their	
terror	of	death	by	agitating	for	“justice”	“on	behalf	of”	the	victim(s),	
thereby	reassuring	 themselves	 that	 the	 tragedy	 is	an	anomaly	 in	an	







a	 monoculture.	 The	 major	 social	 networking	 sites—Facebook,	
Twitter,	 Tumblr,	 Instagram,	 Reddit—are	 each	 hosts	 to	 hundreds,	 if	
not	thousands,	of	subnetworks,	 formed	both	from	personal	contacts	
between	 users	 (“friends”	 or	 “followers”)	 and	 from	 more	 loosely	
organised	 shared	 interests	 (hashtags, 3 	groups,	 and	 subforums).		
However,	 the	 largest	 two	 of	 these—Facebook	 and	 Twitter—	




awareness	of	users	even	 if	 they	or	their	 immediate	contacts	are	not	
active	participants	in	transmitting	them.	To	the	limited	extent	that	it	
is	 possible	 to	 speak	 of	 “internet	 culture”,	 it	 is	 these	 events	 which	
constitute	it;	it	is	these	events	which	are	the	most	useful	examples	on	
which	 to	 found	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 potential	 of	 the	 internet	 as	 a	
political	space.4		
																																																								
3	See	“The Use of Twitter Hashtags in the Formation of Ad Hoc Publics”, 
http://snurb.info/files/2011/The%20Use%20of%20Twitter%20Hashtags%20in%20the%20Formation%









three	main	 spheres	 of	 human	 activity,	 alongside	 labour	 (sustaining	
the	 life-cycle	 through	 the	 cultivation	 of	 food	 and	 other	 biological	






are	 constantly	 struggling	 to	bring	 into	being.	 In	my	reading,	Arendt	
does	 not	 impose	 a	 false	 separation	 between	 labour,	 work,	 and	
politics	(which	she	also	refers	to	as	“action”);	she	 is	quite	clear	that	
each	 is	 at	 least	 partially	 dependent	 upon	 the	 others.	 But	 for	 her,	
political	 action	 is	 the	most	 interesting,	most	 difficult,	 and	 therefore	
the	most	important	sphere	of	human	world-making	activity.	Political	
action,	 unlike	 the	 other	 sorts	 of	 activity	 she	 discusses,	 is	 always	
contingent	 and	 uncertain.	 Unlike	 labour	 and	 work,	 which	 are	 each	
interactions	with	the	material	world,	action	functions	entirely	in	the	
realm	 of	 ideas;	 the	 products	 of	 action	 have,	 in	 themselves,	 no	
concrete	 existence.	 So	 worldmaking	 involves	 a	 complex	 set	 of	
mitigations,	in	which	labour	and	work	look	to	the	realm	of	action	for	
the	 narrative	 structures	 which	 endow	 their	 activity	 with	 meaning,	
while	action	 looks	to	 labour	and	work	for	the	material	actualisation	
of	its	imaginative	potential,	a	process	which	Arendt	calls	“reification”.	
The	 contingency	 of	 action,	 however,	 is	 not	 fully	 addressed	 by	
recourse	 to	 other	 spheres	 of	 activity;	 Arendt	 devotes	 considerable	















The	 unpredictability	 which	 the	 act	 of	 making	 promises	 at	 least	
partially	dispels	is	of	a	twofold	nature:	it	arises	simultaneously	out	of	
the	“darkness	of	 the	human	heart”,	 that	 is,	 the	basic	unreliability	of	
men	who	never	can	guarantee	today	who	they	will	be	tomorrow,	and	
out	 of	 the	 impossibility	 of	 foretelling	 the	 consequences	 of	 an	 act	




dilemmas	 do	 not	 arise	 from	 action	 itself,	 but	 from	 the	 presence	 of	
other	people	whose	actions	may	 impinge	upon	our	own.	We	cannot	










its	 own	 structure	 that	 changes	 over	 time	 and	 reveals	 itself	 in	 a	 private	
context	 as	 custom,	 in	 a	 social	 context	 as	 convention,	 and	 in	 a	 public	




The	 world,	 then,	 is	 the	 space	 that	 humans	 have	 in	 common,	 and	
worldmaking	 is	 the	 task	 of	 tending	 to	 that	 commonality,	 creating	
structures—both	 physical	 and	 conceptual—which	 enable	 and	
enhance	our	existence	as	individuals	living	in	relationships	of	mutual	
responsibility	with	 and	 to	other	 individuals.	 	 There	 is	 an	 important	
distinction	 here	 between	 commonality	 and	 collectivity:	 the	 former	
enhances	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 individual	 through	 a	 system	 of	
relationships	of	mutality	with	other	 individuals.	The	 latter	obscures	
the	 boundaries	 between	 individuals,	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 renders	 both	
relationship	and	mutuality	impossible.		
***	
The	 question	 about	 the	 extent	 to	which	 internet	 culture	 influences	
culture	 offline	 is	 contentious,	 and	 unlikely	 to	 be	 settled	 any	 time	
soon.	In	many	social	networks,	the	option	of	anonymity	is	integral	to	




attempts	 by	 networks	 such	 as	 Google	 Plus	 and	 Facebook	 to	 force	
users	 to	 identify	 by	 their	 legal	 name	have	 proven	 both	 contentious	
and	 ineffective. 7 	Anonymity	 does	 not	 obscure	 only	 detailed	
demographic	 data;	 the	 potential	 for	 a	 single	 individual	 to	 create	
multiple	 identities	 on	 any	 given	network	 can	make	 even	very	basic	
usage	statistics	difficult	to	ascertain.	The	most	concerted	attempts	to	
study	 social	 network	 demographics	 have	 been	 undertaken	 by	
marketing	firms,	and	largely	limited	in	geographic	scope,	generating	
little	 useful	 data	 for	 researchers	 interested	 in	 potential	 cultural	
transference	 across	 national	 and	 linguistic	 boundaries.8	77%	 of	 all	
Twitter	accounts	are	registered	outside	of	the	United	States.9	In	a	raw	
numerical	 analysis	 of	 accounts	 active	 every	 month,	 the	 US	 is	
dominant	 (followed	 by	 the	 UK,	 Canada,	 Australia,	 Brazil,	 Germany,	
Netherlands,	 France,	 India,	 and	 South	 Africa),	 but	 measuring	 per	
capita	 use—the	 number	 of	 Twitter	 users	 in	 a	 country	 relative	 to	
national	 population,	 which	 can	 be	 taken	 as	 a	 very	 rough	
measurement	 of	 Twitter’s	 potential	 for	 social	 influence—tells	 a	
rather	 different	 story,	 with	 the	 top	 nations	 being	 Kuwait,	
Netherlands,	 Brunei,	 UK,	 USA,	 Chile,	 Ireland,	 Canada,	 Sweden,	 and	
Puerto	Rico.10		
Even	 this	 loose	 data	 sketch	 is	 already	 suggestive	 of	 a	 potential	
disparity	between	the	producers	and	consumers	of	 internet	culture;	
the	 digital	 ‘we’	 is	 influenced	 by	 American	 and	 British	 culture	 to	 a	
























either	 directly	 from	 network	 usage	 data	 or	 else	 by	 inductive	
reasoning	from	this	data:	
• We	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 read	 English	 (although	 advances	 in	
machine	translation	are	quickly	changing	this).		
• We	 have	 sufficient	 access	 and	 leisure	 time	 to	 be	 reasonably	
invested	 in	 digital	 culture.	 While	 technological	 advances	 are	
continually	 lowering	 the	 threshold	 for	 entry,	digital	 culture	 is	
still	largely	a	domain	of	relative	economic	privilege.	













It	 is	 tempting	 to	 understand	 this	 assumption	 in	 unambiguously	
positive	 terms,	 as	 digital	 anonymity	 permitting	 individuals	 to	meet	
and	know	each	other	as	substantial	persons	freed	from	the	burden	of	
prejudice	linked	to	accidental	characteristics	such	as	race,	gender,	or	
economic	 status,	 fulfilling	 the	 promise	 of	 Galatians	 3:28:	 “There	 is	
neither	Jew	nor	Greek,	slave	nor	free,	male	nor	female,	for	you	have	
all	become	one	in	Christ.”12	Viewed	in	this	light,	personally	assuming	



















intended	 to	 mitigate	 against	 the	 unreliability	 of	 the	 world	 made	
manifest	 in	 the	events	 that	prompt	 such	expressions,	but	 is	 a	much	
deeper	act	of	solidarity.		
But	what	can	solidarity	possibly	mean	in	this	context?	Clearly	it	
is	not	affiliation	based	on	 shared	characteristics,	 either	 the	 location	
based	 characteristics	 identified	 by	 Durkheim	 as	 mechanical	
solidarity,	 nor	 is	 it	 the	 labour-based	 interdependency	 he	 labelled	
“organic	solidarity”.13	Nor	is	it	the	political	solidarity	that	has	become	
the	 common	 currency	 of	 race	 and	 gender	 justice	 movements,	 in	
which	members	 of	 a	minority	 group	who	 have	 nothing	 in	 common	
save	 for	 their	 race,	 gender,	 religion,	 etc.,	 nevertheless	depend	upon	
one	 another	 as	 members	 of	 a	 group	 constituted	 around	 a	 shared	
characteristic,	 to	 act,	 whenever	 and	 however	 possible,	 in	 one	
another’s	 interests	 insofar	 as	 those	 interests	 are	 defined	 by	 the	
shared	 characteristic. 14 	Here,	 however,	 no	 clear	 degree	 of	
interdependence	exists;	the	vast	majority	of	people	using	the	hashtag	
do	not	 appear	 to	 share	 any	obvious	 characteristic	 connected	 to	 the	
individuals	 or	 events	 being	 commemorated.	 They	 are	 not	 African	
American,	French	secularists,	publishers	of	satirical	news	magazines,	
Queer,	or	Latinx.	What	is	being	enacted	is,	then,	either	a	simulacrum	
of	 solidarity	 or	 else	 a	 process	 by	 which	 the	 utterance	 itself	 brings	
solidarity	 into	 being,	 by	 creating	 or	 enhancing	 a	 previously	 non-
existent	or	unacknowledged	 commonality	with	 the	 actual	 victim.	 In	
this	 light,	 such	 expressions	 of	 solidarity	 are,	 instead,	 moments	 in	
which	the	potential	redemption	of	the	world	is	made	manifest	in	the	
collective	exercise	of	human	agency.15	
I	 am	 wary,	 however,	 of	 ascribing	 an	 excess	 of	 redemptive	
potential	 to	 technological	 innovation,	 just	 as	 I	 am	 wary	 of	 the	

















Jews,	 in	 which	 Jews	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	 forced	 conversion	 or	
extermination	 in	 order	 to	 further	 the	 project	 of	 Christian	
universalism.	 Similar	 attitudes	 and	 tactics	 have	 also	 been	 deployed	
against	 indigenous	 populations	 and	 people	 on	 the	 disability	
spectrum. 16 	More	 recently,	 the	 perception	 of	 anonymity	 as	 the	
default	 in	 digital	 space	 has	 been	posited	 as	 a	 contributing	 factor	 in	
some	of	the	more	widely	publicised	campaigns	of	online	harassment	
against	 minorities,	 such	 as	 Gamergate,	 in	 which	 women	 who	
comment	 on	 the	 prevalence	 of	 violent	 misogyny	 portrayed	 within	
video	 games	 are	 subjected	 to	 sustained	 barrages	 of	 violent	 and	
misogynistic	 threats	broadcast	across	 social	media.17	One	persistent	
theme	 in	 this	 harassment	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 victims,	 by	 calling	
attention	to	the	ways	in	which	they	differ	from	the	anonymous	norm,	
by	 speaking	as	women,	have	 not	 only	 passively	 invited	 but	 actively	
sought	the	negative	attention	to	which	they	have	been	subjected.	
In	this	light,	what	is	being	enacted	in	digital	utterances	such	as	
“Je	 suis	 Charlie”,	 #ican’tbreathe,	 or	 #WeAreOrlando	 is,	 however	
strong	 the	 intention	 towards	 solidarity	which	 prompts	 them	 on	 an	
individual	level,	also	a	process	in	which	distress	at	the	unreliability	of	
the	 world	 is	 mitigated	 precisely	 by	 causing	 actual	 victims,	 and	






harm	 is	 diluted	 when	 it	 is	 distributed	 from	 individuals	 who	 have	
suffered	 particular	 wrongs.	 If	 #icant’breathe	 but	 I’m	 still	 standing	
here	 talking	 to	you,	 then,	hey,	maybe	breathing	 isn’t	actually	such	a	
big	deal	after	all.	
This	is	the	point	at	which	the	logic	of	distribution	breaks	down	




physically	 inseparable	 from	 the	 person	 who	 is	 harmed. 19	
Responsibility	may	be	diluted,	because	responsibility	has	no	physical	







be	 performed	 on	 harm	 is	 to	 lessen	 our	 awareness	 of	 its	 link	 to	 a	
particular	 physical	 person,	 and	 lessen	 thereby	 the	moral	 claim	 that	
any	 particular	 individual	may	make	 in	 light	 of	 the	 harm	 they	 have	
suffered.	
When	 distributed	 responsibility	 meets	 distributed	
victimisation,	the	predictable	result	is	an	uncomfortable	stasis:	we’re	
all	 somewhat	 culpable,	we’re	 all	 somewhat	 injured,	 and	 so	 the	best	
thing	 we	 can	 do	 for	 ourselves	 is	 to	 quietly	 get	 on	 with	 our	 lives.	
Again,	there	are	some	who	would	argue	that	such	a	stasis	is,	if	not	an	
absolute	 ideal,	 then	 certainly	 a	 pragmatically	 acceptable	 basis	 for	 a	
society	 to	 function.	 However,	 the	 stasis	 is	 easily	 disrupted,	 and	
individual	claims	to	actual	victimisation	are	particularly	threatening,	
to	the	point	that	when	such	claims	appear,	they	are	often	treated	as	
attacks	 not	 only	 on	 social	 cohesion	 as	 a	 whole—the	 fictional,	
anonymous	 digital	 ‘we’—but	 also	 on	 every	 other	 individual	 in	 the	




coordinator	 George	 Zimmerman,	 #BlackLivesMatter, 20 	which	
immediately	 inspired	a	counter-protest	movement,	#AllLivesMatter,	
which	claims	that	focussing	on	the	particular	tendency	for	black	lives	
to	 be	 regarded	 as	 at	 best	 disposable,	 and	 at	 worst	 threatening	 to	
social	 cohesion	 through	 their	 very	 existence,	 oppresses	 white	
people—by	making	 race	 an	 issue,	 #BlackLivesMatter	 has	 dissented	
from,	and	 thereby	undermined	 the	assumption	of	homogeneity	 that	
governs	online	 communities,	as	well	as	 the	American	national	myth	
of	the	melting-pot.	
Of	 course,	 movements	 towards	 social	 equality	 being	
characterised	 by	 those	 who	 largely	 benefit	 from	 inequality	 as	
“making	 trouble”	 is	 nothing	 new;	 we	 do	 not	 need	 a	 nuanced	
understanding	of	digital	culture	to	discuss	this	phenomenon.	But	we	
do	 need	 to	 understand	 the	 particular	ways	 in	which	 digital	 culture	
amplifies	 this	 argument.	 The	 language	 of	 the	 collective,	 “us”	 versus	
“them”,	 has	 always	 been	 a	 tool	which	 enables	 attitudes	 that	would	
not	 be	 tolerated	 in	 a	 polite	 society	 if	 they	 were	 expressed	 on	 an	
individual	level.	Because	online	interaction	is	stripped	of	many	of	the	
identity	signifiers	that	 inform	judgement	offline,	 the	 language	of	the	




holds	 when	 a	 speaker’s	 national,	 ethnic,	 gendered,	 religious	 and	
economic	particularity	is	evident.		
Not	only	is	the	claim	to	neutrality	in	digital	collectives	not	truly	
neutral,	 it	 is	 also	 sharply	 limited	 in	 its	 scope.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 viral	
spread	 of	 the	 photograph	 of	 Aylan	 Kurdi	washed	 up	 on	 a	 beach	 in	
Turkey	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2015,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 multiple	 calls	 to	
political	 and	 humanitarian	 action	 to	 address	 the	 refugee	 crisis,	
nobody	 has	 said	 “We	 are	 all	 Aylan.”	 Nobody	 has	 said	 “We	 are	 all	
trapped	together	in	small	rafts	on	a	rough	sea.”	Nobody	who	is	not	a	
refugee	 has	 said	 “Our	 children	 are	 drowning.”	 Even	 the	 expansive,	
unstable	 identity	 culture	 of	 the	 internet	 has	 its	 limits.	 The	 digital	
“we”	is	not	universal;	it	cannot	stretch	to	include	Syrian	refugees.	
Now,	 the	 obvious	 objection	 that	 someone	 is	 getting	 ready	 to	
raise	is	the	two	memes	which	arose	in	response	to	 je	suis	Charlie:	 je	
ne	suis	pas	Charlie,	which	was	 used	 to	 express	 discomfort	 precisely	
with	 the	 identity	 claim	 je	 suis	 Charlie,	 largely	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	
distaste	 for	Charlie	Hebdo’s	 style	 of	 satire,21	or	 je	suis	Ahmed,	which	
commemorated	 Ahmed	 Merabet,	 a	 Muslim	 police	 office	 who	 was	
killed	by	the	gunmen	as	they	entered	the	office	of	Charlie	Hebdo,	and	
which	attempted	to	add	nuance	to	the	public	discourse	surrounding	
the	 Charlie	Hebdo	 shootings	which	 otherwise	 tended	 to	 present	 an	
undifferentiatedly	Western,	 secular	 “us”	whose	value	of	 free	 speech	
(with	 no	 regard	 given	 to	 effects	 of	 that	 speech	 upon	 its	 audience)	
must	be	defended	against	 the	 racially	 and	 religiously	particularised	
Muslim	Other.	And	my	response	to	that	objection	is	that,	 in	the	first	
instance,	 what	 is	 being	 contested	 is	 not	 really	 the	 boundary	 of	 the	
collective,	 but	 its	 character:	 the	 utterance	 is	 “I	 am	not	 Charlie”,	 not	
“Charlie	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 me”;	 the	 assumption	 behind	 the	
utterance	 is	 that	 I	 am,	 in	 some	 tangible	 way,	 similar	 enough	 to	
Charlie	 that	 there	 is	 a	need	 for	 the	distinction	 to	be	pointed	out—I	
am	 a	 participant	 in	 a	 “we”	 in	 which	 most	 others	 have	 declared	
themselves	 to	 be	 Charlie	 and	 I	 am	 dissenting	 from	 that	 particular	
declaration,	 in	 this	 particular	 instance,	 without	 thrusting	 either	
myself	or	Charlie	outside	of	the	“we”.		The	second	case,	je	suis	Ahmed,	
may—possibly,	 within	 some	 particularly	 contrived	 argumentative	
limits—represent	a	genuine	boundary	negotiation,	but	it	is	still	quite	







all)	which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 traversal	 of	 the	 us-them	boundary	had	
already	 been	 accomplished,	 during	 his	 life,	 by	 his	 own	 efforts	 and	
those	 of	 his	 parents;	 the	 political	 function	 he	 filled	 in	 death	was	 to	
demonstrate	 the	 permeability	 of	 that	 boundary	 to	 those	 who	 may	
have	been	otherwise	prone	to	forget.	
The	 conclusion	 we	 can	 draw	 from	 all	 of	 this	 is,	 I	 am	 afraid,	
rather	disappointingly	limited.	The	available	evidence	compels	me	to	
argue	that	the	internet	is,	in	Arendt’s	terminology,	a	tool,	which	aids	
in	 the	 accomplishment	 of	 its	 task	without	 substantially	 altering	 the	
nature	of	the	task	itself—though	the	key	word	here	is	“substantially”;	
I	 am	 not	 saying	 that	 it	 changes	 nothing. 22 	The	 internet	 has	
accelerated	the	rate	at	which	action	is	reified	and	disseminated,	but	
primarily	among	individuals	who	were	already	political	actors.	It	has	
enabled	 the	projection	of	 action	 across	 a	wider	 geographical	 range,	
and	 permitted	 negotiations	 between	 actors	 across	 traditional	
national	 and	 cultural	 boundaries,	 but	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
internet	 and	 previous	 communication	 technologies	 appears,	 in	 this	
respect,	 to	be	one	of	degree	rather	 than	kind.	Anything	 the	 internet	
has	done	in	this	regard	has	also	been	done,	albeit	on	a	more	limited	
scale,	by	some	other	medium—although	we	might	fairly	note	that	no	
previous	medium	has	been	quite	 so	 accessible	 in	 so	many	different	
ways	all	 at	once.	We	are,	 in	 short,	making	 some	adjustments	 to	 the	
scale	of	the	world	and	the	other	actors	with	whom	we	negotiate	our	
belonging	within	 it,	 but	 this	 adjustment	 is	mostly	 incremental.	 The	
major	 alteration	 that	 the	 internet	 brings	 to	 such	 negotiation	 is	 the	
anonymity	 of	 the	medium	 (which	 is	 itself	 not	 really	 an	 innovation;	
the	 pamphleteers	 of	 previous	 centuries	 also	 had	 the	 option	 of	
anonymity).	 This	 alteration	 should	 be	 viewed	 with	 caution;	 it	 can	
actually	 stifle	 worldmaking	 potential,	 as	 it	 permits	 individuals	 to	
imagine	 themselves	not	as	 inhabiting	a	 community	of	equals	where	
everyone	 has	 the	 same	 capacity	 to	 act	 according	 to	 their	 diverse	
interests	 and	 desires,	 but	 as	 part	 of	 a	 collective,	 in	 which	 no	
negotiation	 is	 necessary	 or	 even	 possible,	 as	 the	 basic	 similarity	









her	 death	 shows	 that	 this	 concern	 remains	 current.	 There	 is	 no	
technological	 redemption	 in	 the	 offing.	 The	 tools	 that	 we	 have	 at	
hand	will	only	amplify,	and	perhaps	accelerate,	the	process	of	world-
making	 or	 world-disintegration	 for	 which	 we,	 ourselves,	 retain	
responsibility.	
